metonymy4u

When analyzing the character of a question, it is often useful to subdivide reason into several categories, merely for the sake of developing a reliable lexicon. Indeed, data gathered by developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget and Howard Gardner, have also confirmed the validity of certain aspects of this practice.

Consider the age old brain teaser: “If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a noise?”

We can answer this question in several ways:

1. Yes, we know it makes a noise because we’ve seen lots of trees fall, and not one of them has failed to make a noise, therefore the tree that falls makes a noise, irrespective of any witnesses to the event.

2. Yes, we know it makes a noise because objects have mass and when they fall they release energy, and some of that energy in an atmospheric environment causes movement in the molecules of the atmosphere, which we call noise.

3. Yes, we know it makes noise because two distinct events cannot differ only in their appearance, but must differ as well in their essence, or they would not really be different events, they would only appear to be different events. Therefore the event with the tree upright must differ in some respect from the event with the tree prone, in some way other than just the appearance of the forms involved. Therefore, some other essential characteristic of the situation must also have changed, and whether it is sound or some other mysterious change in the “aether” of the universe, something has to have changed other than just the appearance of the situation.

4. Yes, we know it makes a noise because we know that no object can hit another object without that other object being launched into motion. Therefore, when the tree hits the ground, the molecules of the ground are launched into motion by the motion of the tree. When the molecules of the ground bump into the molecules of the air, they are similarly launched into motion. When the molecules of the air hit the molecules of our ear drum, they are similarly launched into motion and we “hear” the “noise.” “Noise,” therefore, is every motion of molecules before our ear drum molecules are launched into motion, and “hearing” is every motion of molecules that occurs after the molecules of our ear drum are launched into motion. Therefore the tree makes “noise” in the forest even when no one is around to “hear” it.

So what is the difference between each of these models of the event?

#1 is an example of inductive empirical reason: an observation of a series of experienced events from which we induct (infer) a principle and apply it to the hypothetical example. This is what Kant called synthetic (inductive) a posteriori (empirical) reason.

#2 is an example of inductive logical reason: an observation of a logical principle (conservation of energy) from which we infer another principle and apply it to the hypothetical example. This is what Kant called synthetic a priori reason.

#3 is an example of deductive logical reason: an application of a wholly logical principle (the identity of indiscernibles) from which we deduce (derive) the logical consequences as they apply to the hypothetical example. This is what Kant called analytic a priori reason.

#4 is an example of deductive empirical reason: an application of a wholly logical principle (conservation of energy) from which we deduce the actual events that must occur in the hypothetical situation. Kant would have called this analytic a posteriori reason, but probably did not believe it was possible to have such judgments.

given that there is absolutely no way to justify the idea that killing and eating a cow is more ethically acceptable than killing and eating a human, how can we ever believe in any moral good?

poetry is about reshaping language. just to show you it can be done. the rest? –effort in the world—is up to you…

Behaviorism is often given a bad name by those who I will call the meaning seekers. These are authors who think that to present a description of stimulus and response is inadequate. Whether they wish to add back in some sort of symbol, signifier, or the more scientific sounding “cognitive appraisal,” they are nevertheless engaging the age old practice of seeking something else. For the past 250 years, our particular community version of this quest has it that human psychology can be subdivided into two primary components: the immediate experience, or sense data, and the synthesis of the data through interpretation and judgment.

But what if we looked at the situation from a different perspective? What if instead of seeking the inner synthetic principles of knowledge we instead learned to speak simply about the felt sense of experiences? What if we analyzed events, without remainder, into descriptions of experiences and degrees of certainty about those experiences? And for this felt sense of certainty—a.k.a. meaning—we substituted for the authoritarian sounding “truth,” a poetic discourse whose symbolism could only be cashed out when apprehended by an audience of our peers?

On this reading, “meaning” does not lose any of its value to the community for being interpreted in terms of stimulus and response. It merely abrogates any claim to authoritarianism. And so the meaning seekers lose nothing they didn’t already have, and the behaviorists gain all that they wished to gain from the very beginning. Which is an acknowledgement that meaning itself is simply one event amongst many—though, to be sure, an event particularly interesting to those of us who are aware of living inside our own skins!